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ARTICLES
THE ASSESSMENT OF EXPERTISE:
TRANSCENDING CONSTRUCTION
Randolph N. Jonakait*
INTRODUCTION
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held that
scientific evidence must be based on "good grounds" in order
for it to be admitted.
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scien-
tific .. .knowledge." The adjective "scientific" implies a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Sim-
ilarly, the word "knowledge" connotes more than subjec-
tive belief or unsupported speculation .... [Iln order to
qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testi-
mony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e.,
"good grounds," based on what is known. In short, the re-
quirement that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific
knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.'
To make this determination, a trial court must under-
take a "flexible" inquiry into whether the proffer is of truly
"scientific knowledge." "Many factors will bear on the in-
quiry," but the trial court should consider whether the theory
or technique "can be (and had been) tested [and] whether [it]
has been subjected to peer review and publication."2 The
trial court should also consider "the known or potential rate
of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90
(1993).
2. Id. at 593.
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controlling the technique's operation" as well as the accept-
ance of the theory or technique in the scientific community.'
In adopting this flexible framework, the Court explicitly
stated that it was not deciding how the admissibility of other
expert evidence ought to be assessed.4 Courts, however, have
traditionally employed a dual-level approach to the admissi-
bility of expert testimony. Novel scientific evidence has been
subjected to a special scrutiny,5 while other expertise has
been admitted with little examination. Courts have seldom
analyzed whether the expert opinion is based on "good
grounds," as Daubert requires for scientific expertise. In-
stead, judges have generally only demanded that a proffered
nonscientific expert have appropriate qualifications; if so, the
testimony has been allowed as long as it is relevant. In prac-
tice, since courts have usually determined that the witness is
qualified as an expert,6 courts have undertaken little screen-
ing of nonscientific expertise. 7
3. Id. at 594.
4. Id. at 594-95. "Rule 702 also applies to 'technical, or other specialized
knowledge.' Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is
the nature of the expertise offered here." Id. at 590 n.8.
5. Id. at 592-93. Daubert, however, has ended the traditional distinction
between novel and non-novel science. "Although the Frye decision itself focused
exclusively on 'novel' scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of
Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence." Id. at
592 n.11.
6. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1158
(1991) [hereinafter Gross] ("[If it appears that the witness has at least the min-
imal qualifications for an expert in the field in which she is offered, she will
usually be permitted to [testify]."); Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical
Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRICS
J. 375, 390 (1991) [hereinafter Champagne et al.] ("Injury trials, if it is a close
question whether an expert is qualified to testify, 80% of the judges were in-
clined to let the jury hear the testimony."). See also Christopher P. Murphy,
Experts, Liars, and Guns for Hire: A Different Perspective on the Qualification
of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 IND. L.J. 637, 654 (1994) [hereinafter Mur-
phy] ("[Qiualification of an expert is within the broad discretion of the trial
judge; appellate courts will not disturb such discretion unless the ruling is man-
ifestly erroneous.").
7. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1999, 2010-11 (1994) ("[T]he qualification of the ex-
pert presumptively qualifies the technique. This formulation of the relevancy
approach makes the trial court too dependent on the testifying expert. Unfortu-
nately, experience shows that qualified witnesses do testify to questionable
conclusions.").
Cf. David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of So-
cial Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1012 (1989)
("The usual response, and in fact the law's apparent course, has been to trust
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This article will discuss why this dual-level approach
should end and how a more unitary approach to expert evi-
dence might be achieved. Part I discusses how the basic
premises and logic of Daubert, the text of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702, the impracticalities of finding a useful boundary
between scientific and other expert testimony, the informa-
tion available to the jurors for evaluating expert testimony,
and conclusions from the sociology of science all indicate that
the dual-level approach should cease. Part II discusses how
Daubert implicitly accepts that science is a path to good
knowledge about the empirical world and rejects the view
that science is merely a construct on the same footing as
other kinds of knowledge. The principles that allow confi-
dence that science is advancing knowledge provide a general
framework, discussed in Part III, for assessing all expertise.
PART I
A. The Text of Rule 702
Daubert's most fundamental conclusion is that scientific
expertise must be more than just relevant and not unfairly
prejudicial to be admissible. Instead, the trial judge must
specially filter scientific evidence. This is so, Daubert con-
cluded, because Federal Rule of Evidence 702 authorizes the
admission of "scientific.., knowledge," and that term implies
something beyond relevance. "[T]he word 'knowledge' con-
notes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
The term 'applies to any body of known facts or to any body of
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds.' "
The one sentence of Rule 702, however, does more than
specify when scientific evidence is admissible. It defines the
basic conditions necessary for the admission of any expertise:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may tes-
certain professional fields to decide which findings can be of assistance. This
practice results in the presumptive admissibility of the testimony of any accred-
ited expert whose testimony is otherwise relevant.").
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
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tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."9 A wit-
ness may, thus, testify as an expert when three conditions
are met: (1) there is distinctive knowledge, (2) which will aid
the jury, and (3) the witness is a qualified expert. The text
does not vary these prerequisites depending on the type of
expertise, but demands them equally of all.
The term "knowledge" appears only once. The most
straightforward textual reading means that if the definition
of "knowledge" requires a trial court to screen scientific evi-
dence to make sure that it is based on "good grounds," as
Daubert commands, then a court should have to sift other
purported expert knowledge to make sure that it too is not
merely a subjective belief, but instead is based on good
grounds. 10 If the opinion does not rest on good grounds, then
it is simply not "knowledge" within the meaning of Rule
702.11
While what constitutes "good grounds" may vary depend-
ing on whether the proffered expertise is scientific or not, the
Rule does not authorize nonscientific expertise merely be-
cause the testimony will aid the jury and the witness has the
9. FED. R. EVID. 702.
10. See David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 555, 559 (1995) ("Daubert could be read to apply only to 'scientific
knowledge,' given the Court's heavy reliance on the definition of the word sci-
ence in both its dictionary sense and its more philosophical sense. Such a read-
ing displays a crabbed interpretation of the Court's opinion as well as a miscon-
struction of the principles underlying Rule 702."). Compare Thomas M. Homer
& Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in Child Cus-
tody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: I.
Predictable Rates of Diagnostic Error in Relation to Various Clinical Decision-
making Strategies, 25 FAM. L.Q. 217, 246 (1991) ("Few courts or lawyers probe
the basis for experts' claimed expertise beyond examining their superficial and
often-inflated resumes and curricula vitae.... but intense scrutiny of the foun-
dation of claimed expertise ought to be standard.") with Michael H. Gottesman,
Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EM-
oRY L.J. 867, 878 (1994) ("When a highly qualified scientist is testifying within
the specialized field to which she devotes her out-of-court career, her opinions
should be admitted without further inquiry.").
11. Cf. Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility:
Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 979 (1982) ("For a science to
be the basis of expert testimony, it does not have to be as precise or validated as
the laws of motion, but specialized knowledge can assist the trier of fact only if
it exists."); Susan R. Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: Assessing Evi-
dentiary Reliability in Toxic Tort Litigation, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1307, 1321
(1993) ("Invalid reasoning and methods cannot result in probative conclusions;
thus, evidence that is derived through invalid methods or reasoning is not
relevant.").
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qualifications of an expert. The third qualification must be
met. If the text and Daubert indicate that the trial judge
must filter scientific evidence, then they also indicate that the
trial judge must screen nonscientific expertise for distinctive
"knowledge," that is, facts or ideas based on good grounds,
before it can be admitted.
B. The Difficult Demarcation Line
If the dual-level approach to Rule 702 with sharply dif-
ferent treatment of scientific and nonscientific expertise were
to continue, the line demarcating "scientific evidence" be-
comes crucial. 12 That boundary, however, is so difficult to
draw and can lead to such strange results that it should not
be constructed unless truly necessary.
Perhaps the most reasonable definition of "scientific evi-
dence" is that it is information generated by a scientific
method (or a scientific method itself). This demarcation, how-
ever, reduces Daubert to a nullity, for according to that deci-
sion, evidence derived from the scientific method is
admissible.
The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the
methods and procedures of science . . . . [I]n order to
qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method.'"
Consequently, if Daubert were confined to evidence pro-
duced by the scientific method, then Daubert would only ap-
ply to evidence that would be admissible. Evidence not ad-
missible under Daubert because, by definition, it is not
scientific evidence, would be gauged by some other, presuma-
bly less strict, standard and still could be admitted.
14
12. Cf. Richard D. Friedman, The Death and Transfiguration of Frye, 34
JURIMETRICS 133, 139 (1994) ("A great deal of the evidence to which Rule 702
applies either is clearly not considered scientific evidence or is close to the line
between scientific and other forms of specialized knowledge.").
13. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (admitting the testimony as "skilled" expertise after concluding that fo-
rensic document examination expertise could be scientific, but did not meet
Daubert's standards). See also Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266
(9th Cir. 1994) ("While a scientific conclusion must be linked in some fashion to
the scientific method,... non-scientific testimony need only be linked to some
body of specialized knowledge or skills."). Cf. Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The
Limitations of Daubert and Its Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific Experts, a
3051997]
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This circularity might be avoided if Daubert were limited
to proof that a proponent claims is scientific. 15 Daubert could
then have some meaning, but presumably that meaning
would diminish as lawyers learned to label their Daubert-
questionable proffers as something other than scientific.
If, however, the justification for a dual-level approach to
expertise is that jurors have difficulty evaluating science and
give it special deference, the Daubert strictures could perhaps
apply to any evidence that a juror could reasonably under-
stand to be scientific, no matter how the adversaries charac-
terized it. 16 While the next section will contend that the ar-
gument over jurors' perception of science cannot justify the
dual-level approach, even if it might, a definitional dilemma
remains: When is it that jurors reasonably understand evi-
dence to be scientific? That answer is not apparent. Neither
Daubert nor Rule 702's text gives guidance. As long as
Daubert is seen as affecting only part of expert evidence, a
line-drawing problem exists.
Even if a workable boundary could be drawn based upon
juror's perceptions of what is science or what the proponent
claims is scientific, that does not mean that it should be.
Under such standards, the proffered proof to which Daubert
will be applied will have some of the trappings of science, for
it is such trappings which will lead to the claim or perception
of science. If, however, science is the best, or at least a good,
method for producing knowledge about the empirical world, 17
evidence which is not good enough science to pass Daubert
Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993), 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134, 143, 147 (1995):
The testimony is not scientific testimony unless it is based on the scien-
tific method, which means the theory must be tested. Accordingly, if
testing is not performed, there is no scientific knowledge. If there is no
purportedly scientific knowledge, Daubert is inapplicable .... Issues
of reliability in these cases ought to be left to the jury, not to the judge
Id.
15. See Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 179
(1995) ("Probably the best rule, and the one that appears to be implied by
Daubert, is that a witness who purports to base testimony upon scientific
knowledge must be tested under the standards stated in Daubert.").
16. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(possible prejudice from nonscientific forensic document examiner testimony to
be alleviated by instruction to jury that the witnesses offer practical, not scien-
tific, expertise).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
306 [Vol. 37
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may still be better information than evidence which has no
pretensions to science. The athlete who tries out for the
Olympics and fails is probably a better athlete then the one
who never seeks to qualify. Data which is close to being ac-
ceptably scientific, and might be regarded as scientific by the
jury, but fails to satisfy Daubert, may be better proof than
that which has no claim of being scientific. Under the dual-
level system, however, with stricter scrutiny for the "scien-
tific," that near-scientific evidence would be excluded, while
the clearly nonscientific might be admitted. The bifurcation
of Rule 702 can mean the exclusion of better evidence than
what the jury hears.
C. Jurors' Perception of Scientific Evidence
As indicated, the rationale for a specially strict scrutiny
of scientific evidence as compared to other testimony seems to
rest on the notion that jurors will give special deference to
scientific evidence. Because science has a special aura for
laypeople, it may (or will) be readily accepted by a jury. Ju-
rors can analyze normal testimony, and courts need do little
screening before jurors hear lay evidence. Jurors, on the
other hand, have difficulty analyzing scientific testimony and
will too readily accept it. Since they are likely to accede to it
without analysis, courts should try to make sure that it is re-
liable before admitting scientific evidence. 8
This argument, however, is not drawn from Daubert's
logic. The Court did not hold that specially restrictive admis-
sibility standards were required because jurors defer to sci-
ence. The decision, once again, derived, purportedly, from
the term "scientific knowledge," not from an assessment of
the jury's abilities to evaluate science. If Rule 702 authorizes
stricter screening for scientific evidence than for other expert
testimony, it should somehow be found in the term "technical
or specialized knowledge," not in assumptions about jurors
aptitudes. 19
18. Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1481, 1524 (1995) ("The modern debate about the
different classifications of expertise and their effect on judicial evaluation of ex-
pert testimony is largely the result of disagreement concerning the potential for
particular types of testimony to sway jurors imprudently.").
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95
(1993). The Court, while not indicating that a concern over the juror's abilities
to evaluate expert testimony was part of a Rule 702 consideration, did state
1997] 307
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In any event, concern about the jurors' ability to evaluate
science misses the point. The relevant comparison if the
dual-level system is to be justified is not between the scien-
tific and the lay witness, but between the scientific and the
nonscientific expert. Do jurors really give more deference to
an epidemiologist reporting a purportedly scientific study of
the effects on human health of electromagnetic fields than to
a treating physician who gives a personal, nonscientific opin-
ion about causation or the likelihood of full recovery from in-
juries?20 Is the DNA expert more deferred to than the ac-
countant valuing business assets or the real estate
appraiser?2 The notion that juries have special difficulties
with scientific evidence in comparison to other expert testi-
mony is hardly self-evident and has little support.22
For example, at least one survey has found that jurors
believe that they understand scientific evidence as well as
other evidence.23 Another study has found that jurors more
willingly accept experts who present information nontechni-
cally and give firm conclusions than those who do not.24 If
that it could affect a Rule 403 analysis. Id. In doing so, Daubert did not distin-
guish scientific from other expert testimony. Id. "Expert evidence can be both
powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Be-
cause of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative
force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts
than over lay witnesses." Id. at 595.
20. Cf. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAw, SCIENCE, AND TECH-
NOLOGY IN AMERICA 124-26 (1995) (in discussing a toxic tort case, concluded,
"The court, in other words, reaffirmed the jury's right to place treating physi-
cians, who bore direct witness to [plaintiffs] condition, at the top of the hierar-
chy of credibility.").
21. Cf. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ("With regard to scientific experts, a major rationale for Frye, and now
Daubert, is that scientific testimony may carry an 'aura of infallibility.' ...
Skilled experts generally present less of a problem, as, with all due respect,
accountants are unlikely bearers of an aura of infallibility." (internal citations
omitted)).
22. See Champagne et al., supra note 6, at 388 ("[L]ittle is known, other
than through anecdote, about how jurors are affected by expert testimony.").
23. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the
Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987) ("Jurors
indicated to us they believed they understood the scientific and physical evi-
dence presented to them at least as well as, and commonly better than, other
evidence in the case.").
24. Champagne et al., supra note 6, at 388. In one survey, 36% of jurors
found experts most believable who presented information in a nontechnical
manner, and 31% found most believable experts who reached firm conclusions.
Id. The authors concluded, "Given the limits and uncertainties of scientific
knowledge, firm conclusions are a sign that the [jury] should look upon the ex-
308 [Vol. 37
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valid scientific knowledge is tentative, as Daubert recog-
nized,25 and often technical or probabilistic, the jury is less
likely to believe the resulting scientific testimony than other
kinds of expert opinions that are simply and definitely
expressed.26
While the tentative and technical nature of science may
make jurors less deferential to it than other kinds of exper-
tise, jurors can actually have better information for evaluat-
ing scientific than nonscientific expertise. Science should be
based not on the word of a scientist, but data which is avail-
able to all. Content, not personal authority,28 should define
good science. 29 At least theoretically jurors do not have to
pert with some distrust, yet the underlying reason for using experts-limited
juror or judge knowledge of an issue-makes it understandable that jurors
would like clearer answers to scientific and technical questions. It appears that
the tentativeness of much scientific work is unappreciated by many jurors." Id.
25. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
("Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.").
26. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Ver-
dicts, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 343, 347 (1991) (discussing how juries assimilate in-
formation into stories). Consequently, jurors should find more acceptable ex-
perts who present a complete story. See also Margaret B. Kovera et al., Expert
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of Expert Evidence Type and
Cross-Examination, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 653, 668 (1994) (jurors' ratings of
expert who presented probabilistic information was less positive than experts
who presented more anecdotal information).
27. See ROBERT K MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 273-74 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973) ("The substan-
tive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to
the community .... [There is] an imperative for the communication of findings.
Secrecy is the antithesis of this norm .... ).
28. Cf. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: How TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS
AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 31 (1987) ("Science is seen as the opposite of
argument from authority."); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOV-
ERY 46 (Torchbook ed., 1961) (No matter how intensely felt "a subjective experi-
ence, or a feeling of conviction, can never justify a scientific statement . .. .);
Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free "Scientific
Knowledge" in the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 85, 86 (1996) ("Science is
oriented toward the truth but its claims are presented tentatively and are sub-
ject to refutation, with an emphasis on the quality of the data rather than on
decisions produced by an hierarchical structure.").
29. Cf. MERTON, supra note 27, at 270 (Scientific claims are "subjected to
preestablished impersonal criteria; consonant with observation and with previ-
ously confirmed knowledge. The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the
lists of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their pro-
tagonists .... "); STEVEN ROSE, THE MAKING OF MEMORY: FROM MOLECULES TO
MIND 185 (Anchor ed., 1993) [hereinafter ROSE] ("This is what is meant by
claiming that scientific knowledge is 'public' knowledge-that is, that it is in
principle testable and verifiable by anyone/everyone and not merely a matter of
private belief."); Murray Levine, Scientific Method and the Adversary Model:
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just take a scientist's word for the presented conclusions, but
can examine the grounds upon which it is based. Perhaps
most important, that foundation can be examined and chal-
lenged by cross-examination and other experts.3 0 As a result,
jurors can have something to evaluate besides just the per-
sonal credibility of the testifying expert.
Much nonscientific expertise, however, is ultimately
based upon personal authority leaving nothing to evaluate
but credibility. This is especially so when an expert bases
conclusions upon "experience" or "expertise." When an expert
testifies that because of his training and experience that
some fact is true, the expertise is really a claim of personal
authority. In essence, such an expert testifies, believe what I
say not because of the data I present, but because of who I
am.
In such circumstances, the information and reasoning
upon which the opinion is based is not accessible to all. The
basis for the testimony is truly available only to the one per-
son who has had that particular training and experience. 3'
As a result, neither cross-examination nor another expert can
do much to elucidate, evaluate, or contest the data and prem-
ises upon which the testimony relies.32 The opponent can
only attack the training, experience, or personal credibility of
the expert or present another expert who, too, may base an
opinion on training and experience. The jury, unlike with sci-
entific expertise, has no way to assess the expert testimony
Some Preliminary Thoughts, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 661, 664 (Sept. 1974) ("The ca-
nons of method require that we admit as scientific only that which is public and
communicable. By those terms we mean that the observations may be made by
any qualified observer who is in a position to observe and that we can tell the
new observer how to put himself in such a position.").
30. MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE IN LITIGATION 5 (1983) ("[TIhe fact-finder need never take a scientific
expert witness's 'word for it."').
31. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control Over Expert Testimony: Of
Deference and Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1156, 1161 (1993) (When expert
judgment is at stake "[i]t is often difficult for experts . . .to articulate the
grounds on which their judgment rests. On biological or medical questions, for
example, judgment often comes from an accretion of small bits of information
into a whole that is more coherent than the sum of its parts.").
32. See Gross, supra note 6, at 1171-72 ("[An expert who testifies to conclu-
sions that are based on her 'experience' and 'expertise' is less vulnerable to at-
tack than one who relies on explicit data or specified lines of reasoning."); cf
Kovera, et al., supra note 26, at 669 (studying jurors' assessments of child abuse
experts, the strength of a cross-examination had little effect on a jurors' judg-
ments even though all the expertise was questionable).
[Vol. 37310
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other than by accepting or rejecting it based upon who the
expert is and how she asserts her opinion.3"
This is not to suggest that juries necessarily evaluate sci-
entific evidence well. 34 Even if they don't, the dual-level ap-
proach to expertise is justified only if jurors assess nonscien-
tific expertise much better than the scientific kind. That
proposition is supported by neither logic nor convincing data.
33. See Faigman, supra note 7, at 1085 (When conflicting empirical claims
have not been adequately tested "jurors have no well-founded basis on which to
choose between them. Such battles are likely to be won by the more persuasive
witness, rather than the more persuasive facts or opinions."). See also Steven
C. Bank & Norman G. Poythress, Jr., The Elements of Persuasion in Expert
Testimony, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 173, 178 (1982) ("It is well documented by
numerous laboratory studies that, other things being equal, [the expert wit-
ness] attributed to have the greater status or credentials is usually the more
persuasive or influential."); cf. Morse, supra note 11, at 1026 ("[A] psychody-
namic formulation [of behavior] is an unverifiable and unreliable causal ac-
count of an individual case .... Cross-examination will not be an effective tool
for exposing the inaccuracy of psychodynamic formulations because the
factfinders will have no means to resolve disputes.").
34. Even when the bases of scientific opinions are presented, some jurors
are more likely to make personal judgments about the experts than the infor-
mation relayed. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on
Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1993). Part of the
problem is that even though scientific data is presented, cross-examination is
often still an attack on credibility that does little to clarify the strengths and
weaknesses of the opinion. Id. at 47. Cf. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law
in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REV.
715, 789 (1994) ("Veracity, memory, motivation, prejudices and biases-the
weaknesses that cross-examination is best at ferreting out-are not very rele-
vant to attacking an expert's reasoning ... ."). To improve our factfinding sys-
tem, we should not only discuss the admissibility standards for expert testi-
mony but also how expert evidence can best be presented and challenged so
jurors are more likely to assess the information instead of just the personal
credibility of the experts. Sanders, supra at 60-85.
The point remains, however, that often with nonscientific expertise the ju-
rors will have nothing to evaluate but the personal credibility of the experts,
and there is no reason to assume that jurors can evaluate nonscientific exper-
tise better than the scientific kind. See Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doc-
trine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1769, 1187-85 (1986) (reviewing studies on jurors' use of scientific evidence
and concluding that jurors evaluate the science when they are made to under-
stand the science, but evaluate the credibility of the experts when the science is
not made understandable to the jury); cf. Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller,
The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1131, 1131 (1993) ("The deeper question is whether fact finders are to be
educated by or to defer to experts. The various debates about expert testimony,
as enlightening as they have been, cannot be resolved without addressing that
question.").
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D. Expertise as a Social Construct
Sociologists of science have contended that science has no
magic spyglass on objective truth. Science, instead, presents
social constructs, as other epistemological endeavors do.
The most significant insight that has emerged from
sociological studies of science in the past 15 years or so is
the view that science is socially constructed .... [T]he
"facts" that scientists present to the rest of the world are
not simple reflections of nature; that, these "facts" are
produced by human agency, through the institutions and
process of science, and hence they invariably contain a so-
cial component.3"
35. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Sci-
ence, 32 JURIMETRICS 345, 347 (1992). Elsewhere Jasanoff has summarized:
The authority of scientific claims derives, according to the sociological
account, not directly, from the representation of physical reality, but
indirectly, from the certification of claims through a multitude of infor-
mal, often invisible, negotiations among members of relevant disci-
plines. A complex network of people, methodologies, visual recordings
or inscriptions and instruments (which themselves incorporate social
conventions) must be brought into harmony in order to establish scien-
tific claims as true .... [E]ven when a claim's factual status is still "in
the making," its provisional nature may be screened from public view
by a technique that sociologists of science call "boundary work": that
is, a communally approved drawing of line between "good" and "bad"
work (and, not trivially, between good and bad workers) within a single
discipline, between different disciplines, and between "science" and
other forms of authoritative knowledge.
JASANOFF, supra note 20, at 52-53. See also Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology (sic) and Legal Process, 15
CARDozo L. REV. 2183, 2196 (1994) [hereinafter Farrell] ("[Slociologists of sci-
ence have concluded that not only is the scientific process a social construct, but
that scientific truths are socially constructed as well."); cf. Theodore R. Val-
lance, Social Science and Social Policy: Amoral Methodology in a Matrix of Val-
ues, 27 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 107 (Feb. 1972):
[Sicience is not value free, and.., social science, whether 'purely theo-
retical' or 'applied,' is in its every phase entwined in the values of the
society which or on which it would operate. The choosing of what to
investigate in any field is culturally relevant and represents value
judgments present in the culture and manifested in the scientist.
Steven Rose gives a good short history of this intellectual development. See
ROSE, supra note 29, at 292-93. While Karl Popper saw science as the creation
and testing of hypotheses with the hypotheses being abandoned when they
were falsified, Thomas Kuhn contended that normal science "is not about test-
ing hypotheses but merely about puzzle-solving within a given understanding
of the world-an understanding that Kuhn called a paradigm." Id. (refering to
THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962)). Research that
usually conflicts with a hypothesis is somehow made to fit the paradigm. Id.
When the anomalies become too great, however, "revolutionary" science occurs
with a new hypothesis generated; a paradigm shift then occurs. Id. "What
1997] ASSESSMENT OF EXPERTISE 313
Consequently, "neither science nor law has a greater
claim to the truth, and courts ought not to accept for legal,
evidentiary purposes the conventional standards of validity
and reliability established by scientists" 36 as Daubert seems
to require. Courts ought to recognize that the admissibility
standard has a "normative component" and, thus,
"[c]onsideration of appropriate legal standards for the admis-
sion of scientific evidence is not, and should not be, divorced
from the substantive contexts in which the standards are
applied."37
This analysis, while seeming to attack Daubert at its
core, indicates yet again that Rule 702 should not be con-
strued as having a dual-level approach to expertise. The fun-
damental conclusion is that science should not be seen as an
objective purveyor of facts. Science is produced by a human
agency and contains a social component. Science, conse-
quently, does not just discover facts; it "constructs" them.
In saying this, the sociologists are not saying that science
is distinctive. Instead, they are saying that science is like
made a paradigm attractive . .. ; and why did scientific revolutions occur?
Kuhn left such questions as internal to science,... but the sociologists could see
there was more to it than that, and the social order external to the laboratory
might influence what went on inside. This enabled them to recapture the in-
sights into the social functions and relations of science that an earlier genera-
tion of marxist scientists had already found, and it presaged their eventual
move into a hyper-reflexive stratosphere with which scientific knowledge of the
natural world itself dissolved into a miasma of social relations." Id. Perhaps
most influential here has been Bruno Latour whose "deconstructionist accounts
of science began with his experience as a post-doctoral anthropologist, when he
spent a year as a partially participant observer in a California laboratory work-
ing on the identification and isolation of a neuro-hormone. The account he gave
of this in his first book, and the theoretical extrapolations that have followed,
have influenced a generation of sociologists of science." Id. at 293-94. See also
BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION (1987); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR,
LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979).
36. Farrell, supra note 35, at 2198.
37. Id. at 2213. See also JASANOFF, supra note 20, at 44 & 209-10:
[S]cience in a legal setting is always bound up with some specific con-
structions of causation, blame, and responsibility .... [T]he [law's]
choice between alternative scientific accounts necessarily involves nor-
mative, even political, judgments .... Instructing courts to take their
cues from idealized stories of heroes and villains, such as the "good"
scientific methodology of Gregor Mendel as opposed to the "bad" scien-
tific practices of T. D. Lysenko, can therefore be deeply misleading.
Other forms of guidance are needed, more realistically attuned to inde-
terminacy of scientific knowledge in the actual contexts of litigation,
and mindful of the institutional strengths and weaknesses of judicial
dispute resolution.
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other fields of knowledge.3 8 Nonscientific learning, as well as
the scientific, is also mediated by human agency, and there-
fore, nonscientific fields of expertise the law draws upon must
also be social constructs. 9 If scientists are not objective and
disinterested purveyors of fact, other kinds of experts are not
either.4' And if most of the thoughts, conclusions, and conjec-
tures by scientists can be wrong,4 ' then so too can be the con-
clusions of other experts. If science is a social construct, it is
not fundamentally distinct from other kinds of knowledge,
and the law should not treat it as fundamentally different
from nonscientific expertise.
E. One Fundamental Standard for all Expertise
Scientific testimony should not be screened by a dis-
tinctly different, and more rigorous, standard than is used for
nonscientific expertise. Rule 702's text, the difficulty and
hazards of drawing the boundary line, the logic of Daubert,
jurors' evaluation of expertise, the structure of science, and
the sociology of science all indicate that the same fundamen-
tal standard ought to be used to assess all expertise. If so,
even though Daubert was explicitly speaking about a specific
form of expert testimony, the basic premises that support it
should somehow be extended to all evidence offered under
Rule 702. The articulation of such standards, however, is not
38. See LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 31 ("[Slcientific activity is
just one social arena in which knowledge is constructed.").
39. Cf. JASANOFF, supra note 20, at 207 ("There is no way for the law to
access a domain of facts untouched by values or social interests.").
40. See David Faust, Declarations. Versus Investigations: The Case for the
Special Reasoning Abilities and Capabilities of the Expert Witness in Psychol-
ogy/Psychiatry, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 33, 52 (1985) ("[Als is true with all indi-
viduals, introspection about one's own judgment process and capacities can be
very misleading. As many researchers have shown, individuals usually attend
more closely to information that confirms their beliefs than information that
does not."); cf. JAMES WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX 18 (1968) (stating that suc-
cessful scientists recognize that many scientists are narrow-minded and
stupid).
41. See W. I. B. BEVERIDGE, THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 79-80
(Vintage ed., 1957):
Most [scientific] hypotheses prove to be wrong whatever their origin
may be .... The productive research worker is usually one who is not
afraid to venture and risk going astray, but who makes a rigorous test
for error before reporting his findings .... [E]ven with men of genius,
with whom the birth rate of hypotheses is very high, it only just man-
ages to exceed the death rate.
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an easy task: Any attempt to generalize Daubert beyond sci-
entific proof runs into problems.
For example, Daubert's flexible framework may be so
subject to different meanings that the opinion hardly gives
useful guidance on the admissibility of scientific evidence.
4 2
Certainly, the outpouring of comments as to what it means or
ought to mean suggests that this is true.43 If Daubert is not
clear for resolving questions about scientific evidence, it does
not seem to be able to give good guidance for other areas of
expertise.
Indeed, even if its framework had a more determinate
meaning, Daubert seems naively to have undertaken the im-
possible by creating one set of guidelines for all of science
when good science uses more than one method.44 And of
course, if one set of guidelines, no matter how clear, cannot
42. See Faigman, supra note 10, at 555 ("Daubert provides precious little
advice on how to successfully resolve the tangled relations between law and
science."); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What
That Means for Forensic Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2103, 2104 (1994) ("The
wonder of flexible inquiries is that they can so often be made to fit just about
any predetermined conclusion .... The skeptic may feel that flexible standards
seldom produce results; instead, they are devices merely used to justify conclu-
sions reached on other grounds.").
43. See Faigman, supra note 10, at 555 n.3 ("The lack of advice to be found
in Daubert perhaps is best illustrated by the surplus of commentary seeking to
interpret and advance the Daubert lesson" and collecting a representative sam-
ple of the commentary.).
44. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Urie Bronfenbrenner, On the Demise of Eve-
ryday Memory, 46 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 27, 28 (1991) [hereinafter Ceci Bronfen-
brenner] ("There is nothing in the classical conception of science nor in the mod-
ern sociological view of it... that would support equating science with a specific
set of methods."); R. C. LEWONTIN, Facts and the Factitious in Natural Sciences
in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines
478, 489 (James Chandler et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Lewontin] ("The de-
mands for rigor of experimental design in theoretical inference vary widely in
science from field to field, sometimes between very closely allied domains off
research."); Peter Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Poli-
tics, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 20 (1993) ("[TIhe conventional contrast between
'hard' and 'soft' sciences tracks important divisions that belie the merely super-
ficial unity of the scientific culture .... Theoretical and experimental scientists
do quite different things and think in different ways."); Paul S. Milich, Contro-
versial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J.
913, 920 (1994) ("But 'the scientific method' is not the same for all disciplines of
science and in any case does not specify a particular level of'appropriate valida-
tion' before a principle or methodology is accepted as reliable."). Cf. Black et al.,
supra note 34, at 747 n.226 ("Though the [Daubert] Court referred to the scien-
tific method, its opinion is generally sensitive to the fact that science cannot be
reduced to a single method."); Farrell, supra note 35, at 2203 ("[T]o provide uni-
formity, the courts would have to establish a body of precedent with regard to
316 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
truly evaluate all of science, it seems silly to extend that
framework to the myriad other forms of expert evidence.45
Certainly specific components of Daubert's flexible framework
such as falsifiability, peer review, and error rates seem im-
possible to apply to such expert witnesses as the mechanic,
the accountant, the real estate appraiser, the harbor pilot,
and perhaps even the psychologist.4 6
Even so, however, as Part II discusses, some basic princi-
ples do underlie Daubert, and these principles can and should
be extended to expertise more generally.
valid scientific methodologies in various disciplines, in effect legitimating par-
ticular scientific paradigms.").
45. One study of experts in state civil cases found that:
Half of the experts in our data were medical doctors, and an additional
9% were other medical professionals-clinical psychologists, rehabili-
tation specialists, dentists, etc. Engineers, scientists and related ex-
perts made up the next largest category, nearly 20% of the total. The
only other sizeable categories were experts on various aspects of busi-
ness and finance (11%), and experts in reconstruction and investiga-
tion (8%).
Gross, supra note 6, at 1119. Another survey found that "[tihe plurality (48%)
were physicians. The other areas of expertise were wide-ranging. There were
four veterinarians and a smattering of psychologists, accountants, economists,
historians, political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, personnel specialists, bio-
chemists, and engineers .... [Tihere were almost as many areas of expertise as
there were experts .... " Champagne et al., supra note 6, at 381. Cf. CARNEGIE
COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECH., AND GOV'T, SCIENCE AND TECH. IN JUDICIAL DE.
CISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES 22 (1993)
("Engineers are among the most frequently encountered expert witnesses; they
appear in a wide variety of cases such as construction disputes, product liability
actions, and complex environmental litigation."); Epstein, supra note 31, at
1159 ("The amount of variation in the cases covered by Rules 702 and 703 is
enormous, and it is highly unlikely that any uniform approach will not suffer
from possible cross-pressures and counterexamples.").
46. Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a
Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific
Expert Testimony, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 2272, 2285 (1994) ("[A]lthough the
Daubert Court may have selected the optimal test for the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence, that test is useless as a criterion for the admissibility of other
types of expert evidence."); James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Apply-
ing Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10, 11 (1995)
("[Tihe nature of certain social and behavioral science theories may be inher-
ently inconsistent with Daubert criteria such as 'falsifiability' and 'error
rates."').
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PART II
A. Science Works
The view of science as a social construct has power, but
the law rejects the extremist consequences of the sociological
claim. Taken to its limits, this belief would see all scientific
evidence as equal. If it is merely socially constructed, none
should be "privileged" over others. Since it is all of equal sta-
tus, all of it should be admitted. On the other hand, if no
scientific evidence is more worthy or convincing or right than
others, then admission of such testimony would not truly aid
the jury.4 7 Indeed, if all social constructs are equal, the jury,
unaided, is as capable of producing a construct as valid as it
would with expert help.
Evidence law as interpreted by Daubert implicitly, but
definitively, rejects these radical views. All science is not ad-
mitted; all is not excluded. Science is not all equal. For the
purpose of our trials, some scientific evidence is to be trusted
more than others.
This is correct. The logic of trials is that of ordinary com-
mon sense,48 and people using common sense do not see sci-
entific principles as merely equal social constructs. The sci-
entific and technological principles that indicate my car will
stop when I step on the brakes are facts that I have come to
believe reflect the world. If there is social construction in sci-
ence, we make distinctions among the constructs. I have my
daughter vaccinated, but I do not ask the doctor to bleed her.
Although my common sense may not be able to articulate the
reasons, I believe that there are valid bases for making such
distinctions. When we get in an airplane or elevator, or take
an antibiotic, or turn on a computer or television, we have
47. The widespread admission of expert evidence, however, will make trials
more costly. See Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1162 (1994) (The liberal admission of expert tes-
timony "would tend to make cases involving expertise more protracted."). Cf.
Farrell, supra note 35, at 2215 (The liberal admission of scientific evidence
"would make courts, particularly juries, the instruments of wealth redistribu-
tion rather than more representative bodies.").
48. See GRAHAM C. LILLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 27
(2d ed. 1987) ("[Tlhe test of probative value is derived from commonplace expe-
rience. That is, the test usually involves no more than a commonsense determi-
nation, made in the light of human observation and experience, that certain
events or conditions either are causally connected or normally associated with
other events or conditions.").
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confirmation in our daily lives that some science is truly reli-
able and not just a mere social construct.49
Science, however, is a product of its time. Scientists are
not infallible and without biases. 50 No sensible defender of
science would maintain that scientists are truly objective, but
that does not mean that human and social limitations affect
all of science identically. As Philip Kitcher states, "[O]f
course people make mistakes. Our observational and infer-
ential procedures for generating belief are fallible. They are
not equally fallible."5 Furthermore, sensible scientists
would not claim that science has found absolute truth about
the empirical world. They might claim, however, with good
grounds, that in a universe where perceptions and beliefs are
imperfect, science has been the best human method for ad-
vancing understanding of the natural world.
Scientists are not infallible. Science is not a process
by which we go from no knowledge to some knowledge, or
from some knowledge to total knowledge. Rather it is a
process by which scientists go from some knowledge to
more knowledge. The important feature of science is not
that it always produces increased knowledge but that
sometimes it does. Science is not a perfect machine for
grinding out true claims about the world in which we live,
but it is the best of all the imperfect machines developed
to date.52
49. See Steven Weinberg, The Methods of Science ... And Those by Which
We Live, 8 AcAD. QUESTIONS 7, 12 (Spring 1995) ("It is a fallacy.., that, because
the [scientific] process is a social one, the end product is a mere social con-
struct."). See also LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 127 ("[T]o say that
[Thryrotropin Releasing Factor] is constructed is not to deny its solidity as a
fact."); cf Johannes F. Nijboer, Forensic Expertise in Dutch Criminal Procedure,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 165, 186 (1992) [hereinafter Nijboer] ("Although the pre-
vailing scientific-sociological opinion holds that factual knowledge is a social
construct, factual knowledge is not a random social construct.").
50. See DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT
OF THE SOCIAL AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 22 (1988)
("[Ilndividual bias is extremely difficult to eliminate.").
51. PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEG-
END, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 139 (1993).
52. HULL, supra note 50, at 26 (1988). See also KITCHER, supra note 51, at
161 ("That thesis does not imply that we have unbiased access to nature,
merely that the biases are not so powerful that they prevent us from working
our way out of false belief."); cf. Weinberg, supra note 49, at 9 ("I do not see why
the fact that we are discovering not only the laws of nature in detail, but what
kinds of laws are worth discovering, should mean that we are not making objec-
tive progress.").
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Sociologists may preach social constructions, but scien-
tists see progress or the lack of it towards understanding the
empirical world.53 Scientists see good or bad science; they see
knowledge advancing or standing still. We, in our daily lives,
often without reflecting on it, accept and reject views of the
world based on what science has learned. Common experi-
ence has us side with the scientists. Science works not per-
fectly, but it works.54 That common sensical view is the one
accepted by Daubert when it concluded that judges must ac-
tively screen scientific evidence.55 The important question
then, as all concede, is how, if scientists are not objective, dis-
interested generators of information, but, being human, are
biased and prey to social forces and limitations,56 is it possi-
53. Cf. HULL, supra note 50, at 26 ("Although scientists themselves are fre-
quently uneasy about using terms like 'true' and 'objective,' all the time that
they spend running experiments and making extensive and careful observa-
tions is inexplicable on the assumption that knowledge is in any significant
sense socially determined."). See also LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at
175 ("[Plracticing scientists ... are unlikely to adopt this perspective [of social
construction] for very long before returning to the notion that facts exist, and
that it is their existence that requires skillful revelation.").
54. See Charles Kester, The Language of the Law, the Sociology of Science
and the Troubles of Translation: Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evi-
dence of Causation, 74 NEB. L. REV. 529, 563 (1995) ("Put differently, science
works. More importantly, the American public believes that science works.");
cf. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1613, 1619 n.21 (1995) ("Despite this lack of an underlying 'truth' in
scientific conclusions, there is virtual unanimity that the scientific process does
assist in determining truth by sorting out some 'falsehoods' through testing and
through the replication of tests.").
55. See Faigman, supra note 10, at 555 ("The single most important 'guide-
post' contained in Daubert is the Court's directive to judges to actively evaluate
scientific evidence."). Sheila Jasanoff, a prominent sociologist of science, does
not contend that scientific evidence should go unfiltered, but only that the
power should be carefully used. Janasoff, supra note 35, at 359. She concludes
that when judges exclude such evidence,
[t]hey help shape an image of reality that is colored in part by their
own preferences and prejudices about how the world should work.
Such power need not always be held in check, but it should be exer-
cised sparingly. Otherwise, one risks substituting the expert authority
of the black robe and the bench for that of the white lab coat-an out-
come that poorly serves the causes of justice or of science.
Id.
56. See, e.g., BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 66-67:
It is not at all rare for investigators to adhere to their broken hypothe-
ses, turning a blind eye to contrary evidence, and not altogether un-
known for them deliberately to suppress contrary results .... A dan-
ger constantly to be guarded against is that as soon as one formulates
an hypothesis, parental affection tends to influence observations, inter-
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ble for science to move from some knowledge to more knowl-
edge? When is science to be regarded above social construc-
tion and reliable enough to be admitted into our trials? While
science may use many tools and methods, science that gives
the most confidence for truly advancing knowledge does rest
on some fundamental principles. 7
B. Encounters With Nature
Good science consists of a series of mechanisms that re-
duce the chances that biases, idiosyncrasies, faulty logic, and
misperceptions will lead to a scientist's self-deception.58 The
most basic of these is that we truly learn about the world not
pretation and judgment; "wishful thinking" is likely to start
unconsciously.
See also Elizabeth Howard, Note, Science Misconduct and Due Process: A Case
of Process Due, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 320 (1994) ("[Tlhe possibility of self-de-
ception is always present in science research.").
57. Scientists believe that while methodological rules differ across scientific
fields, common principles for the assessment of science exist. See, e.g., KITCHER,
supra note 51, at 85-86:
[A]t different stages in the history of science, different individual scien-
tists have expressed different views on matters methodological. Does
it follow from this that there is no set of methodological rules that al-
lies to all sciences at all times? No. If we think of a set of methodologi-
cal rules as formulating the optimal ways for scientists to form conclu-
sions in certain contexts, then the mere fact that people have
sometimes disagreed on what is best does not show that there is no
optimum.
See also id. at 5 ("[Wlhile there is no systematic way to generate new hypothe-
ses, once hypotheses have been proposed there are principles for their proper
assessment in light of statements of evidence."); BEVERIDGE, supra note 41 at xi
("[Tjhere are some basic principles and mental techniques that are commonly
used in most types of [scientific] investigation. . . ."); cf. Nancy Levit, Listening
to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 263, 265 (1989) ("The principles of scientific inquiry are essentially criteria
of rationality."); Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORD-
RAM L. REV. 595, 622 (1988) ('While there is no universal algorithm for verify-
ing scientific validity, this does not mean that no basis exists for judging theo-
ries and claims to scientific knowledge.").
58. See Vallance, supra note 35, at 107 ("The methodology of science is rela-
tively, but only relatively, value free .... [Scientific] methodology is a set of
rules to keep the practitioner of science from misleading himself about what he
is observing and what he is concluding in his study of natural events."). See
also BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 68 ("Unless observations and experiments are
carried out with safeguards ensuring objectivity, the results may unconsciously
be biased."); cf Smis & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 30, at 5 (1983) (Scientific evi-
dence's "advantage over the testimony of lay witnesses is that scientific evi-
dence at its best is not subject to the limitations of human perception, memory,
bias, or interest.").
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from authorities, not from hypothesis-building, not from
logic, but by studying the world.59 Science is derived from a
rigorous, critical observation of nature. In this process, in-
sights, speculations, informed judgment, and theory-forma-
tion are important, but they are not goals in themselves.
They only serve to guide the scientist on how to encounter
nature so as to learn from it." While historical, social, or
personal prejudices, misconceptions, or concerns may have
helped produce the hypothesis, the theory can be accepted
only if it somehow withstands encounters with nature.'
That scientists must go outside themselves and rendez-
vous with the world acts as a limitation on individual and
social bias. This does not mean, however, that every scientist
will see nature similarly. Scientists confront creation in dif-
ferent ways, and their disparate encounters inevitably lead to
59. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 91 (Free
Press ed., 1965) (Before modern science, "[wjhen there was anything that
needed to be explained those men would not elicit their theories from the obser-
vations themselves-they would still draw on that whole system of explanation
which had been provided for them by the ancient philosophy. Sir Francis Ba-
con, early in the seventeenth century, complained of this divorce between obser-
vation and explanation, and it was part of his purpose to show how the latter
ought to arise out of the former."). See also id. at 51 ("In the later middle ages
men realised that in the last resort everything depended on observation and
experience, on dissection and experiment .... ."); Lee Loevinger, Standards of
Proof in Science and Law, 32 JURIMETRICS 323, 324 (1992) ("Bacon argued that
science involves two different mental processes, the making of a discovery and
the demonstration of its truth, and that direct observation of nature is the only
path to truth. This reliance on empirical observation is still the fundamental
premise of science.").
60. See BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 63 ("[A hypothesis] main function is to
suggest new experiments or new observations.... Another function is to help
one see the significance of an object or event that otherwise would mean noth-
ing.... Hypotheses should be used as tools to uncover new facts rather than as
ends in themselves.").
61. See KITCHER, supra note 51, at 306 ("[W]e work our way free of the mis-
takes of earlier [scientific] generations through further encounters with na-
ture."). See also HULL, supra note 50, at 28 ("The truth of empirical claims,
including laws of nature, are tested by what in fact does happen."); Task Force
of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and
Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE
653, 656 n.1 (1976) ("We use the expression 'scientific fact' to mean a result, or
more frequently the anticipated result, of an experiment or an observation of
nature."); cf. THoMAs KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 77 (1962)
("An accepted theory or paradigm gets rejected not just by comparison with na-
ture, but only with the simultaneous acceptance of another. This requires the
comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other."). But see LA-
TOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 243 ("Scientific activity is not 'about na-
ture;' it is a fierce fight to construct reality.").
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differences among them.62 Moreover, as the sociologists
maintain, these experiences are not value-free. The investi-
gator brings to them a belief-system that affects what is
perceived. 63
As a result, science has learned that not all encounters
with nature are equal. The most valuable ones are those that
test hypotheses.6 4 Until testing is done and data exists, a sci-
entific claim, conclusion, theory, or pronouncement can be
nothing more than the assertion of personal authority.65 Un-
like some other forms of learning, the scientist is not at an
end, but a starting point, when apparent knowledge has been
gained from logic or experience. Such an intuition is merely
the preliminary phase to the sometimes difficult and often
62. See KITCHER, supra note 51, at 163:
Social forces might be so strong at the level of individual practice that
precisely the same changes in individual practice would occur
whatever stimuli impinged upon the individual scientist. This formu-
lation is surely false. Scientists who are apparently subjected to the
same social forces disagree because they have engaged in different en-
counters with nature.
See also id. at 97 ("Kuhn and Feyerabend achieved the important insight that
different communities of scientists, working in the same field, may organize the
aspects of nature that concern them in different ways.").
63. Cf Stephen A. Newman, Assessing the Quality of Expert Testimony in
Cases Involving Children, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 181, 207 (1994):
At some point in the course of the expert's inquiry, she will reach some
conclusions, even if tentative, about key issues in the case. After that
point, the expert's perceptions may be affected by those conclusions. It
is a commonplace observation that one sees what one expects to see
and screens out the rest.
Cf also Levine, supra note 29, at 665 (explaining that in psychology, the ob-
server influences and is influenced; he changes what he measures). But cf.
HULL, supra note 50, at 481 ("Just because all scientific theories are un-
derdetermined by anything that might be called 'the facts,' it does not follow
that evidence is irrelevant.").
64. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 2277 ("In effect, Justice Blackmun
[in Daubert] posed the epistemological question: How does a scientist come to
know that a proposition is true? He looked to the methodology of Newtonian
experimental science to answer the question; the process of developing and test-
ing hypotheses explains how a scientist does so." (emphasis added)).
65. See, e.g., KITCHER, supra note 51, at 33 ("[Darwinian] biologists are com-
pelled to advance hypotheses about the historical development of life, and it is
incumbent on them to specify ways of testing these hypotheses (and hence to
undertake [such testing]), if they are to avoid the charge that evolutionary biol-
ogy is simply an exercise in fantasizing."). See also HULL, supra note 50, at 278
("Theories that explain phenomena are necessary to raise them above the level
of curiosities, but theories also need data if they are to be taken seriously.").
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creative process of testing.6 6 The scientist with the appar-
ently innovative insight may be important, but the one who
can figure out how to test it in nature may be more so.
6 7
C. Proof by Disproof
In one view of science, that testing is of a particular sort,
attempts at falsification, 68 and falsifiability is at the contro-
66. See POPPER, supra note 28, at 27 ("A scientist.., puts forward state-
ments, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step. In the field of
empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses, or systems of
theories, and tests them against experience by observation and experiment.");
LEWONTIN, supra note 44, at 480:
These postulations [about causation and the necessary interconnection
between repeatable phenomena] demand the gathering of facts: obser-
vations from nature or from the deliberate perturbations of nature that
are called experiments. When the facts are in, they can be compared
with the postulated relations to confirm or falsify the hypothetical
world."
See also Black et al., supra note 34, at 757 ("No matter how clever and brilliant
a hypothesis might be, it must undergo corroboration through critical examina-
tion and empirical testing. Put more simply, science involves both the acquisi-
tion of knowledge and the justification of knowledge."); Faigman, supra note 10,
at 570 ("A basic tenet of the scientific method is that hypotheses will be rigor-
ously tested, however, promising the early findings.").
67. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON,
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN xii (1992). The author noticed that a specific brain le-
sion caused both flawed reasoning and impaired feelings and hypothesized
"that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason. Two de-
cades of clinical and experimental work with a large number of neurological
patients have allowed me to replicate this observation many times, and to turn
a clue into a testable hypothesis." Id. The author also discusses testing of the
hypothesis, including comparisons of skin conductance responses to disturbing
images between people with frontal lobe damage with those without such dam-
age. Id. at 205-22.
See also EDWARD 0. WILSON, NATURALIST (Warner Books ed., 1994). The
author, as a biogeographer, "had conjured a plausible image of the dynamic
equilibrium of species, with new colonists balancing the old residents that be-
come extinct, but ... could offer very little direct evidence." Id. at 260. He then
tested his hypothesis by fumigating some Florida Keys to see how they became
repopulated and concluded, "[alt least the cruder predictions of the theory of
island biogeography had been met." Id. at 280.
68. See POPPER, supra note 28, at 42 ("[W]hat characterizes the empirical
method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the
system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on
the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing
them all to the fiercest struggle for survival."); see also Black et al., supra note
34, at 753-54 ("[Tlhe single most salient characteristic is falsifiability. For
scientists, a new idea or explanation is not valid unless there is the possibility
that empirical testing can prove it false and until it has withstood thoughtful
efforts at falsification.").
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versial heart of Daubert's notion of science. 69 Falsifiability is
demanded because in an inductive world a proposition can
never be definitively proved true. We cannot establish that
all swans are white by parading ten, one hundred, or one
thousand white swans, for the next swan might still be black,
and the postulate disproved. 7° The scientist, instead, should
seek the only definitive proof; that which would prove the
thesis wrong.71 He should attempt to find black swans. If,
however, rigorous attempts at falsification fail to prove the
hypothesis wrong, the scientist has reasons to think that the
conjecture might be right. Still, the acceptance of the hypoth-
esis must remain provisional because the next attempt at fal-
sification may succeed.72
A philosopher may so define science, but scientists do not
consistently operate in this manner. Scientific investigators
do not just seek to prove their ideas wrong to gain provisional
69. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593
(1993) (noting that testing and falsifiability are the distinguishing factors of
science). Compare Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("I
am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a
theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some [federal judges] will be,
too.") with John I. Thornton, Courts of Law v. Courts of Science: A Forensic
Scientist's Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 475,
478 (1994) ("Rehnquist apparently did not read Popper, because Popper's expla-
nation of what he meant [by falsifiability] are palaces of clarity.").
But cf. Allen, supra note 47, at 1171-72 (questioning whether the fal-
sifiability principle captures many aspects of science and concludes that it "ex-
cludes a substantial portion of what is presently admitted as expert testi-
mony."); Sean O'Connor, The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science: Will the
Real Karl Popper Please Stand Up?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 263, 263 n.3 (1995)
(claiming that Popper's falsifiability criterion was meant to separate "scientific
and empirical knowledge from other matters," not good science from the bad).
70. See POPPER, supra note 28, at 40-41 ("Theories are.., never verifiable
.... These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability
of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation .... [lit must be possible
for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience." (emphasis added)).
71. Cf POPPER, supra note 28, at 50 (stating that strict proof or disproof is
never possible because of possibility that experimental results were unreliable).
72. See POPPER, supra note 28, at 33.
[A] positive decision can only temporarily support the theory, for sub-
sequent negative decisions may always overthrow it. So long as a the-
ory withstands detailed and severe tests and is not superseded by an-
other theory in the course of scientific progress, we may say that it has
'proved its mettle' or that it is "corroborated."
(Emphasis added). See also Faigman, supra note 10, at 1018 ("[Tlhe merit of a
scientific statement depends on the degree to which it has survived attempts at
falsification." (emphasis added)).
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knowledge:7 3 They also seek confirmation of what they think
they already know.74
Even if, however, falsification does not define or describe
how good scientists should, ought, or must always operate, it
does give an important insight. Science does not proceed by
confirmations alone.75 Experience has taught that scientists
can too readily accept personal theories.76 Scientists, like the
rest of us, want what they believe to be actually true.
Humans tend to see what they want to see, and the scientist
seeking confirmation for a treasured conjecture is likely to
find it. Experience has taught that a scientist will naively
believe that a conclusion is justified if only affirmation for it
is sought.77 Indeed, the sensible scientist quickly learns that
before he should even believe his own postulates, much less
convince others of them, he ought to seek what his theory
says should be forbidden.78
Although many techniques can be found in science, at its
core is this method-proof by disproof.79 This may not be all
that a scientist does and proof by disproof does not guarantee
73. See Allen, supra note 47, at 1171 ("Scientists do not believe that all they
know are negatives; they believe they know a lot of positive truths, and are
learning more every year. Most scientific work is designed to expand the reach
of scientific theories, to extend them into new domains, rather than to falsify
them.").
74. Cf. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, HEN'S TEETH AND HoRSEs ToEs 255 (1983) ("In
science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be per-
verse to withhold provisional assent.'").
75. Cf. LEWONTIN, supra note 44, at 479:
Most natural scientists . . . are really positivists. They rely heavily
both on confirmation and falsification, and they believe that the gath-
ering of facts, followed by inference rather than the testing of theories,
is the primary enterprise of science. At times they speak of "strong
inference," by which they mean something close to a Popperian falsifi-
cation criterion ....
76. See BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 148 ("Nothing could be more damag-
ing to science than the abandonment of the critical attitude and its replacement
by too ready acceptance of hypotheses put forward on slender evidence. The
inexperienced scientist often errs in being too willing to believe plausible
ideas.").
77. Cf BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 74 ("Probably the main characteristic
of the trained thinker is that he does not jump to conclusions on insufficient
evidence as the untrained man is inclined to do.").
78. See Thornton, supra note 69, at 479-80 (stating that a good scientific
theory forbids certain things to happen, and every genuine test of a theory is an
attempt to refute the theory).
79. Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 44, at 28 ("[Alt its core, science is a
strategy of'proof by disproof.' Scientists seek to assess the validity of a proposi-
tion by disconfirming alternative explanations.").
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that what survives is reliable, but science has learned that
proof only by confirmation is too likely to be a product of bias,
misperception, or wishful thinking to be trusted. Proof by
confirmation alone is too likely to be a social construct to be
reliable.
D. Rigorous Testing
Individual prejudice is potentially so strong that merely
seeking what should not occur is insufficient to overcome pos-
sible bias. The search must be done in a rigorous fashion,
and that normally requires controls.80
Without controls, the cause of an outcome cannot be de-
termined. As E. Bright Wilson said, "If one doubts the neces-
sity for controls, reflect on the statement: 'It has been conclu-
sively demonstrated by hundreds of experiments that the
beating of tom-toms will restore the sun after an eclipse."'8 1
The proper methodology of controlled experiments, tests, or
inquiries may vary from field to scientific field, but without
80. See BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 20:
The "controlled experiment" is one of the most important concepts in
biological experimentation. In this there are two or more similar
groups... : one, the "control" group, is held as a standard for compari-
son, while the other, the "test" group, is subjected to some procedure
whose effect one wishes to determine. The groups are usually formed
by "randomisation," that is to say, by assigning individuals to one
group or the other by drawing lots or by some other means that does
not involve human discrimination. The traditional method of experi-
mentation is to have the groups as similar as possible in all respects
except in the one variable factor under investigation, and to keep the
experiment as simple as possible.
Cf John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluat-
ing, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 502 (1986):
There is consensus among social scientists of all disciplines that re-
search must possess "validity." That is, the methods used in research
must be able to justify the conclusions drawn by the investigator ....
To have "high" validity, a study must rule out, or "control for," compet-
ing hypotheses that may account for an observed state of affairs.
See also GARY TAUBES, BAD SCIENCE: THE SHORT LIFE AND WEIRD TIMES OF
COLD FUSION 120-21 (1993):
This is the most fundamental commandment in the canon of experi-
mental technique. To reach an unimpeachable conclusion establishing
the cause of an effect, run controls. E. Bright Wilson, Jr., in his classic
1952 volume An Introduction to Scientific Research, described controls
as "similar test specimens which are subjected to as nearly as possible
the same treatment as 'the objects of the experiment, except for the
change in the variable under study."
81. TAUBES, supra note 80, at 162.
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controls, science has learned, a conclusion is too likely to be a
construct to be trusted.
82
E. Biased Individuals; Objective Communities
Good scientists do try to reduce the chances of self-decep-
tion by seeking disproof through rigorous, usually controlled,
encounters with nature,83 and we may be able to rely most
firmly on a result when a scientist has refuted a favorite hy-
pothesis.84 Science as a system, however, does not depend on
scientists proving their own ideas wrong or being able to
82. Cf. BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 25 ("Unless the basic needs of the con-
trolled experiment can be satisfied it is better to abandon the attempt ....
Most of the experiments have proved nothing [when] the controls were not
strictly comparable."). See also Robert M. Andersen, The Federal Government's
Role in Regulating Misconduct in Scientific and Technological Research, 3 J.L.
& TECH. 121, 128-29 (1988):
Scientists are subject to self-deception or forms of experimental bias
that they cannot reasonably be expected to control .... Experimental
bias in studies using human subjects is so common that the use of a
"double blind" has become standard practice not only in human re-
search but also in animal experimentation. A double blind prevents
both the experimenter and the subjects of the experiment from know-
ing which subjects are the controls.
83. See Faust, supra note 40, at 53:
In branches or areas of science in which accurate judgments are possi-
ble, . . . this success is not based on some unusual judgment power on
the part of the practitioners. Rather, success is primarily based on the
availability of a well-developed science that provides established the-
ory, precise measurement techniques, and prespecified procedures and
judgment guidelines.
Cf. Douglas R.O. Morrison, The Rise and Fall of the 17-keV Neutrino, 366 NA-
TURE 29, 32 (1993):
This over-enthusiasm [for the desired result] and the selection of only
positive experiments, is reminiscent of the Anglo-Saxon legal method,
... [where] two lawyers oppose one another; each presents the argu-
ment favourable to his side and, where possible, criticizes the other
sides' arguments. Good arguments by the opposition are ignored. In
the scientific method, each individual is expected to consider all the
arguments, theories and facts and to evaluate them critically to obtain
a consistent conclusion, even though it may require one to reject some
theories and/or experiments.
84. See HULL, supra note 50, at 394 ("When scientists refute their own fa-
vorite hypotheses or their opponents confirm them, one can place considerable
confidence in the results."); cf. LATOUR & WooLGAR, supra note 35, at 116 (quot-
ing R. Guillemin, an eminent pharmacologist, from an interview with Latour,
who similarly commented that "the only thing I can believe in this field are the
retractions.").
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transcend their inherent limitations.8 5 Instead, science pro-
duces something more than mere social constructs primarily
because it is a social activity. Scientists want to influence
others and want credit for what they have produced, as soci-
ologists and scientists recognize.86 Science is a community
enterprise, but instead of being a detriment, it is this commu-
nity as a whole that actually helps produce disinterested
knowledge.
This is not, however, because of schoolbook notions of one
scientist impartially reproducing the work of another.8 7 Few
scientific rewards come from merely testing or replicating the
work of others,88 and too much science is produced for it all to
be rigorously probed.8 9 While it may be true that "[t]he most
important testing that occurs in science is one scientist test-
ing the views of another,"9" that seldom occurs.9 A scientist
85. See HULL, supra note 50, at 435 ("[A] scientist can in principle subject
his or her own views to testing, but if science had to depend solely on individual
scientists proving their own ideas wrong, it would be in real trouble.").
86. See HULL, supra note 50, at 305 (emphasis added):
As multifarious as science has been and continues to be, a great deal
about it can be explained by reference to just three elements: a desire
to understand the world in which we live, the allocation of responsibil-
ity for one's contributions (both credit and blame), and the mutual
checking of these contributions: in short, curiosity, credit, and
checking.
87. See JASANOFF, supra note 20, at 214 ("Decades of research on scientific
controversies have documented the limited nature of the 'organized' skepticism
of science.").
88. See ROSE, supra note 29, at 185:
There is no prestige to be gained from simply repeating someone else's
experiment; you are very unlikely to get a grant to do it, and the main
scientific journals are not normally interested in publishing 'replica-
tions' of experiments unless they are on a particularly controversial
topic. Even failures to replicate are not very interesting to the jour-
nals; experiments with negative results therefore rarely get reported.
See also Howard, supra note 56, at 45 ("[A] premium is placed on original re-
search .... [R]eplicating published experiments reaps little or no reward.").
89. See LATOUR, supra note 28, at 40 (noting that all scientific articles are
not equal. "[Miost papers are never read at all."). See also BEVERIDGE, supra
note 41, at 3 ("[T]he utter impossibility of keeping abreast of more than the
small fraction of the literature which is most pertinent to one's own research.").
90. HULL, supra note 50, at 435; cf. Black et al., supra note 34, at 762 ("The
degree of corroboration does not depend simply on the number of tests, but
rather on their variety and severity. Variety is required because performing
the same test again and again provides little or no new information.").
91. See HULL, supra note 50, at 394 ("Scientists cannot spend very much
time checking the work of other scientists if they themselves are to make
contributions.").
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usually needs an incentive to check another's work,92 and
while such incentives may be only sporadically present, when
such testing does occur it is meaningful. "They reserve
checking for those findings that bear most closely on their
own research, chiefly those that threaten it. Because differ-
ent scientists are committed to different views, the checking
that goes on in science rarely degenerates into empty
show."93
Confidence that knowledge is being advanced is highest
not because of faith that research is unbiased, but when there
is a diverse community containing scientists with different bi-
ases, for then incentives for checking results is at the high-
est.94 Such a community, however, not only may check; it
helps to insure that the researcher will attempt to do work in
a way to transcend individual biases. The investigator who
wants credit and influence in such a competitive community
has strong motivations in doing the original research rigor-
ously because he knows others who see the world differently
may carefully scrutinize his results.
A scientist in a community, however, also seeks to do rig-
orous work because of allies. Such colleagues are unlikely to
test the work for themselves, but, if it seems important, sim-
ply to incorporate it into their own research agenda.95 Credit
and influence wane if allies learn the work was fundamen-
tally flawed. Allies learn this not by testing, but as a by-
product of incorporation, for as the research gets assimilated
into other systems, the work's flaws, if any, will under usual
circumstances, eventually become apparent. 96 Finally, in a
92. Id. at 348 ("Although indiscriminate testing does take place in science,
in general scientists must have some reason to test the findings that someone
else publishes.").
93. HULL, supra note 50, at 394. See also id. at 348 ("Testing is reserved
for findings that put one's own research into jeopardy.").
94. See HULL, supra note 50, at 22 ("One of the strengths of science is that it
does not require that scientists be unbiased, only that different scientists have
different biases.").
95. Cf. ROSE, supra note 29, at 186 ("What people do tend to do if a result
someone else reports interests them is to repeat it with variants-that is, they
test it in their own favourite animal or experimental situation.") See also HULL,
supra note 50, at 348 ("Scientists incorporate into their own work those findings
that support it, usually without testing.").
96. See HULL, supra note 50, at 342:
[S]tatements [scientists] take be true . . .have to be integrated into
theories, while those that are supposedly false are just dumped into a
heap. Thus, within those systems of statements that scientists take to
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community where scientists build on the efforts of others,
scientists have to be adept evaluators. "Science is so struc-
tured that scientists must, to further their own research, use
the work of other scientists. The better they are at evaluat-
ing the work of others when it is relevant to their own re-
search, the more successful they will be."
97
Science, then, progresses and transcends mere social con-
struction because of the interaction between a scientist and
her scientific community. Without a diverse scientific com-
munity concerned with what a researcher produces, individ-
ual bias is not likely to be overcome.98 If the researcher seeks
influence and credit in such a community, however, she has
strong incentives to do rigorous work. Because of the commu-
nity, the work gets checked by those threatened by it and an-
alyzed by those who seek to incorporate it. And if it does get
widely incorporated in ways that ought to show the possible
flaws, but they do not become apparent, we have good
grounds for believing that the scientific claim is more than a
construct.9 9 Science as a community activity, then, is impor-
tant because "the objectivity that matters so much in science
is not primarily a characteristic of individual scientists but of
scientific communities."' °°
be true, errors should ramify. A theory of any scope at all includes
hypotheses from a wide variety of sources. No one scientist can have
firsthand knowledge of every sort of natural phenomenon that bears on
his or her own research.
97. HULL, supra note 50, at 3-4.
98. Id. at 22 ("Because the only person available to test the beliefs of such
isolated investigators is the investigator himself, individual bias is extremely
difficult to eliminate.").
99. Cf. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 106 ("A fact becomes such
when it loses all temporal qualifications and becomes incorporated into a large
body of knowledge drawn upon by others."). See also Bert Black, Review, 1
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 527, 528 .(1994) (quoting HENRY H.
BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND MYTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 45-46
(1992)):
Bauer suggests that science is in many ways like a filter through which
scientific knowledge is "gleaned from a mess of all sorts of suggestions,
claims, and beliefs by progressive refining as errors and inadequacies
are [culled] out." Frontier science-even published research-is not
scientific knowledge until it has survived this filtering process. Only
when other scientists start to use a new idea and build upon it-only
when it becomes "text book" science-is the idea really "scientific
knowledge." According to Bauer, textbooks are 90% right and journals
are 90% wrong ....
100. HULL, supra note 50, at 3. See also Susan Haack, Puzzling Out Science,
8 ACADEMIC QUESTION 20, 26 (Spring 1995):
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F. Specialized Experience and Knowledge
Science can work, as our common sense and daily experi-
ence reveal. Common sense, however, also tells that we can
have learning without science. While scientists advance
knowledge by, in essence, manufacturing encounters with na-
ture, 10 1 we also learn without such manipulation. We gain
understanding from our normal experiences. When those ex-
periences are shared by many, the resulting knowledge is or-
dinary common sense. Some people, however, also have ex-
periences distinct from the common, and the learning derived
from them is distinct or specialized knowledge to the rest of
us. Those with such knowledge are also experts.
10 2
If, as we have seen, however, science can be social con-
struction and affected by human limitations, biases, and mis-
perceptions, then experiential learning must be subject to the
I doubt that real scientists are ever quite single-mindedly devoted to
the truth; all, I expect, are motivated to some extent by the hope of
fame or fortune, or to some degree in the grip of prejudice or partisan-
ship. But to the extent that science is organized so as to maximize the
likelihood that fame and fortune come to those who make real discover-
ies, or that partisans of one approach seek out the weaknesses which
partisans of the other are motivated to neglect, a real community of
imperfect inquirers can be a tolerable ersatz of an ideal community.
Cf. Heidi L. Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74
TEx. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) ("While revised empiricists continue to regard a ver-
sion of testability as one distinctive feature of science, they stress the definitive
role of scientists collective judgment in making testability work.").
101. Cf. Haack, supra note 100, at 25 ("All of us, in figuring out how things
are, use, in Peirce's phrase, 'the method of experience and reasoning'; but sci-
ence has, by [many] means .... enormously deepened and extended the range
of experience and the sophistication of reasoning of which it avails itself."). See
also BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 19:
[Important as experimentation is in most branches of science, it is not
appropriate to all types of research. It is not used, for instance, in de-
scriptive biology, observational ecology or in most form of clinical re-
search in medicine. However, investigations of this type make use of
many of the same principles. The main difference is that hypotheses
are tested by the collection of information from phenomena which oc-
cur naturally instead of those that are made to take place under exper-
imental conditions.
102. See Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 2289 ("Experience is to nonscientific
experts as experimentation is to scientists."); Faust, supra note 40, at 35 ("Ex-
pert witnesses often make appeals to experience to back up their testimony.
The persuasiveness of such appeals is understandable."); cf. Gross, supra note
6, at 1182 ("Expert evidence is based, to a greater or lesser extent, on system-
atic observations of replicable phenomena that are subject to independent study
by trained observers.").
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same possibilities. 10 3 If, as we have also seen, evidence law
attempts to admit science when there are good grounds to be-
lieve it transcends construction, then evidence law should
only admit claimed expert experiential knowledge when
there are good grounds to believe that it, too, transcends indi-
vidual and social limitations and biases.
10 4
Just as we need standards to judge when scientific exper-
tise can be admitted, we need them also for expert experien-
tial learning,10 5 and evidence law demands that those stan-
dards be somehow equivalent to those used to screen
scientific evidence. As Part III discusses, while Daubert's
framework is of limited value in devising those general crite-
ria, the fundamental premises of scientific advancement-
rigorous encounters with nature, proof by disproof, and com-
munity activity that tests or incorporates-are principles
that can, and should, be applied to expertise generally.
PART III
A. The Daubert Factors
Daubert's factors are not readily generalizable to non-
scientific evidence. Just as important, however, they only
partially capture the mechanisms that give confidence that
science has advanced towards more knowledge. Thus, while
falsifiability is a Daubert factor, and falsifiability an element
of proof by disproof, more is needed than theoretical fal-
sifiability for progress. Proof by disproof requires the rigor-
ous testing in nature that allows confidence that individual
103. See Berndt Brehmer, In One Word: Not From Experience, 45 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 223, 225 (1980) (Research has shown "that people do not always
learn from experience, at least not when the experience consists of a series of
cases. This may be a startling conclusion and certainly one that goes against
some of our most cherished beliefs: that experience improves our judgments
and decisions.").
104. See Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 2279:
[Tihe trustworthiness of nonscientific expert testimony is every bit as
suspect as the reliability of scientific evidence. If anything, there is
less assurance of the accuracy and truthfulness of nonscientific expert
testimony .... The lack of doublechecks calls into question the truth-
fulness as well as the accuracy of the nonscientific testimony.
See also O'Connor, supra note 69, at 275 (stating that scientists and experts
believe they know positive truths "is irrelevant if these beliefs are not
justified").
105. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 2283 ("[Clourts have not developed
objective standards to ensure the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony.
Perhaps they have not done so because it cannot be done.").
[Vol. 37332
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limitations have been overcome. It requires not just a theory,
but actions that make it likely that the errors in the investi-
gator's conclusions, if any, would become apparent, and
Daubert does not make this clear.
While touching on the essential proof by disproof,
Daubert succeeds less in capturing the epistemologic role that
the community plays in the scientific process. The Court re-
ferred to peer review, but this is of limited utility in overcom-
ing social construction. While the often idiosyncratic, biased,
and incomplete processes that constitute peer review may
mean that others have examined a paper or proposal and con-
cluded that the project and methods appear worthwhile,
10 6
they do not guarantee that the examination has been rigor-
ously or skeptically done. Most important, peer review says
almost nothing about the truly crucial community activities
of testing or incorporation of the science.
Publication also has a limited value. Certainly without
it, there can be little chance that others will test or incorpo-
rate the work. 10 7 Publication, however, hardly guarantees
that that will happen. Publications are stoppered bottles cast
adrift, seldom making it to shore. Much is published, too
much for it to all be read.108 And of that read fraction, the
106. See HULL, supra note 50, at 158-99 (discussing how haphazard and idio-
syncratic peer review for publication may be; how little it may have to do with
assessing quality and how much with the prejudices and viewpoints of editors
and reviewers). See also JASANOFF, supra note 20, at 94-95 ("Peer review can
take many forms, some far removed indeed from the ideal of neutral and dispas-
sionate scientific inquiry [ .... and is the most important formal mechanism for
enforcing scientific "boundaries."]). Cf. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, So-
cial Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 509 (1986) ("Research that has survived critical review
is not necessarily trustworthy, but likely to of higher empirical quality than
non-reviewed work.").
107. Cf. HULL, supra note 50, at 324 (Publication has "three functions: mak-
ing discoveries public so that anyone who chose to could use them, awarding
credit for the contribution to the author of the paper, and conferring some au-
thenticity to the publication.") See also Black et al., supra note 34, at 776 (Sci-
ence depends on the free exchange of accurately reported information.). Cf. LA-
TOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 47, 71 & 88:
[F]ar from being reports of what has been produced in the [scientific]
factory, members take these papers to be the product of their unusual
factory .... The production of papers is acknowledged by participants
as the main objective of their activity .... Laboratory activity [is] the
organisation of persuasion through literary inscription.
108. Cf. RosE, supra note 29, at 302 ("[Elventually even the weakest paper is
likely to find a published home, though whether it will ever be read or referred
to again is a different matter.").
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scientific community only regards a fragment as impor-
tant.1" 9 The crucial issue is not publication, but what hap-
pens after publication, and the usual response is nothing.11 °
The community only helps assure that science is more than a
construct when others act upon the results, and publication is
merely an initiating step in this crucial process.
Together peer review and publication, however, do indi-
cate that the researcher is trying to be part of the scientific
community and that she wants credit and influence with
peers.111 Such a scientist is aware that others may check re-
sults and hopes that others will use them. These outside
forces give incentives TO the scientist seeking validation
within the scientific community that the isolated scientist
does not have, prompting the former to do the research rigor-
ously. Yet these incentives do not guarantee the necessary
community action.
Finally, while general acceptance does seem like a quin-
tessential community activity, it is one that actually gives lit-
tle assurance that science has been lifted above being a con-
struct. General acceptance is intrinsically a social activity,
and what gets accepted in a scientific field is often highly so-
cially determined. It depends upon "the negotiated agree-
ments within a research community about a host of issues
ranging from the applicable theoretical paradigm to norms of
peer review and publication."1 1 2 The true value of general ac-
109. See Rose, supra note 29, at 302 n.* ("A high proportion of papers, even
in the most prestigious journals, are, it seems, never cited again .... [If you
want to be read and noticed, it becomes necessary to say the same thing often
and in many different places."); cf. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 252
("[Clitation analysts have demonstrated the extensive waste of energy in scien-
tific activity. Most published papers are never read, the few that are read are
worth little, and the remaining 1 or 2 percent are transformed and misrepre-
sented by those who use them.").
110. Cf. HULL, supra note 50, at 287 ("The chief weapon of the scientific to
new ideas is a conspiracy of silence."). The lack of critical response after publi-
cation is no guarantor of reliability. Instead, the absence of a reaction probably
indicates instead that the work was seen as so trivial or obviously suspect that
it would have been a waste of effort to challenge it or incorporate it in another's
research agenda.
111. Cf HULL, supra note 50, at 155 ("Only those concepts that are transmit-
ted can influence the development of science, and the primary vehicles for this
transmission are scientists and their published works.").
112. Jasanoff, supra note 35, at 349. Cf. Haack, supra note 100, at 21-22
(emphasis added):
The basic strategy [of the New Cynics who claim science is a product of
social interests without objectivity] is to shift attention from the nor-
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ceptance varies tremendously because scientific fields employ
diverse standards with greatly differing rigor as to what gets
accepted in each.113 Most important, general acceptance does
not guarantee that the community has acted in such a way to
assure that scientific progress has been made. 114 Once again,
the crucial issue is not whether a scientific society has sanc-
tioned something, but whether the community has tested it
or incorporated it in such a way as to show any flaws.
B. A General Framework for Assessing Expertise
Although the Daubert factors are not useful for devising
general standards for screening expertise, the scientific pro-
cess still holds the epistemological key. Science makes pro-
gress by in effect confronting a crucial question. How likely is
it that any errors in the scientist's belief would be known?
There are good grounds for believing that the scientific asser-
tion is more than a construct only when there is reasonable
confidence that such flaws would become known and they
have not. Each step in the scientific process can increase that
confidence. Errors are likely to be known when reliance is
placed not upon mere "logic" or assertions of authority, but
instead nature is encountered. Flaws are even more likely to
be found when reliance is not placed upon confirmatory evi-
dence, but rigorous proof by disproof is sought. Faults are
even more likely to be apparent when the isolated actor is
disfavored, but a diverse community has tested and incorpo-
rated the scientific results. If a claim survives all these steps
intact, there are good grounds for believing that knowledge
has been advanced and the assertion is not just a construct.
This basic approach can, and should, be applied to exper-
tise generally. Just as this process can give good assurances
mative notion of warrant (of how good the evidence is for this that sci-
entific claim) onto the descriptive notion of acceptance (the standing of
a claim in the eyes of the relevant community).
113. See LEWONTIN, supra note 44, at 491 (stating that the quality of evi-
dence in different scientific fields is tailored to fit ideological demands); LATOUR
& WOOLGAR, supra note 35, at 258 n.3 ("[Tihe importance of somatostatin for
the treatment of diabetes ensure that each of the group's articles is carefully
checked. In the case of endorphine, by contrast, any article (no matter what the
wildness of its conjectures) will initially be accepted as fact.").
114. Cf. David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse
Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying
About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1799, 1808 n.27
(1994) ("[Slome portion of the 'knowledge' of established fields is invalid.").
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that the scientific knowledge is not just a construct, it can
give good assurances that other expertise is truly likely to be
"knowledge."115 Before admitting any expertise, both the sci-
entific and the nonscientific, courts should be grappling with
the same issue: How likely is it that any errors in the beliefs
upon which the expert testimony rests would have become
known? Courts should be examining the encounters with na-
ture that support the nonscientific expert opinion, probing
whether the expert's experiences provide an adequate surro-
gate for rigorous scientific proof by disproof, and exploring
whether community action truly helps assure that individual
limitations, misperceptions, and biases have been
transcended.
C. Nonscientific Encounters with Nature
Just as a scientist can only begin to transcend possible
construction by testing conclusions against what happens in
nature, the nonscientific expert, when describing the world,
should have encounters with that world upon which to base
an opinion. Often that is so obvious that we give it little
thought. We would expect that the expert testifying about
usual accounting practices to have encountered the account-
ing world. We would expect an expert testifying about a
property's value to have encountered the world of property
valuation. On the other hand, if the underlying premises of
an economist are based on his or another's logic, assump-
tions, or theories instead of encounters with the world, courts
should be quick to see that there are not good grounds for
believing the "expertise" is anything more than a
construct. 116
115. See Haack, supra note 100, at 23:
Our standards of what constitutes good, honest, thorough inquiry and
what constitutes good, strong, supportive evidence, are not internal to
science. In judging where science has succeeded and where it has
failed, in what areas and at what times it has done better and in what
worse, we are appealing to the standards by which we judge the solid-
ity of empirical beliefs, or the rigor and thoroughness of empirical in-
quiry, generally.
See also Weinberg, supra note 49, at 13 ("It seem to me that our science is a
good model for intellectual activity.").
116. Cf. Levitt, supra note 57, at 285:
Many assumptions of normative law and economics are either untested
or called into doubt by empirical testing. For example, economists as-
sume that individuals make choices that maximize self-interest. Ex-
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A recent case involving organized crime provides an ex-
ample of where inquiries should have been made as to
whether the expert had satisfactorily encountered the world
he was testifying about.
At trial, Special [FBI] Agent Schiliro testified at great
length on the nature of and function of organized crime
families and disclosing the "rules" of La Cosa Nostra. For
example, Schiliro testified that a "boss" must approve all
illegal activity and especially all murders and that the
functions of the "consigliere" and "underboss" are only
"advisory" to the "boss." . . . Schiliro specifically named
John Gotti as the boss of the alleged Gambino crime fam-
ily and Gravano as the consigliere.1
1 7
Just as a scientist's beliefs must come from encounters
with the nature described for confidence that the claims are
more than constructs, the nonscientific expert's claims must
also come from encounters with the world he testifies about.
Here, apparently, the agent's relevant encounters with the
organized crime world included many informers and surveil-
lance tapes that had not been admitted into evidence.
1 18
Whether the witness had the necessary or sufficient en-
counters was not truly considered by the court. Instead, the
Second Circuit met the defendant's attack on these sources of
information by stating that they satisfied Rule 703, which
permits the expert to base an opinion upon non-admitted evi-
dence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field." 19
planations for this basic assumption, however, are sadly lacking ....
Second, normative law and economics' derivation of legal solutions
through cost-benefit analysis is far from an objective mathematical
process .... Third, when legal facts or rules fail to comport with eco-
nomic theory, efficiency theorists suggest that the rules should be
changed to conform with the theory. This seriously limits the opportu-
nity to disprove efficiency theory. Thus, law and economics theory fails
to comport with the criterion of falsifiability.
Cf. also Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U.
KAN. L. REV. 115, at n.132 (1993) ("[E]conomic analysis of tort law proceeds on
many behavioral assumptions that are either not validated, or have been dis-
proved by empirical research.").
117. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir. 1993).
118. See id. at 937-38 (stating that defendants contended that agent relied
upon "countless nameless informers and countless tapes not in evidence. .. ").
See also id. at 936 ("Schiliro admitted that his sources of information were not
necessarily before the court.").
119. Schiliro was entitled to rely upon hearsay as to such matters as the
structure and operating rules of organized crime families and the iden-
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Even if the testimony comported with Rule 703, however,
Rule 702 still had to be satisfied. The expert had to be
presenting "knowledge," as Rule 702 requires, based upon
"good grounds," as Daubert indicates. From the fragmentary
report, it is not clear that the witness's encounters with the
world he testified about were satisfactory to give him the req-
uisite knowledge. Can a non-accountant testify as an expert
about standard accounting practices based upon talking with
a non-random sample of accountants and overhearing ac-
countants even if such information were reasonably relied
upon a field of experts generally? Was the organized crime
expert different? Answers cannot be given because the basic
Rule 702 questions were not addressed.
D. Nonscientific Proof by Disproof
Science has shown that simple confirmations of a theory
are insufficient to support a conclusion that the claim is not a
construct. We too easily see what we want to see. The same
is true, of course, for all expertise, and thus it should not be
sufficient for the expert merely to cite verifications of his
premises. 120 Instead, the expert's experience has to be the
kind that was likely to show that his premises were wrong if
they were. Without that, the claimed knowledge is too likely
to be a construct to be considered reliable.
The organized crime expert certainly raises this issue. At
some point, because the agent has come to believe that the
head of a crime family controls the actions of its members and
that Gotti was the head of such an organization, the agent
will naturally attend, in a biased manner, to verifications of
his theory and avoid disconfirming information. 121 Science
tification of specific voices heard on tape in forming his opinion, since
there is little question that law enforcement agents routinely and rea-
sonably rely upon such hearsay in the course of their duties.
Id. at 938.
120. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 2290-91 ("When a nonscientific ex-
pert witness cannot point to any experiences supporting the proffered opinion,
the opinion is nothing more than conclusory conjecture.").
121. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral In-
quiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 100-
02 (1993):
[I]f there is general agreement about any concept in social cognition, it
is that of cognitive conservatism. [Searches of information and] of
memory are biased, sometimes heavily, toward the confirmation of ex-
isting schema .... This research suggests strongly that under special
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has shown, however, that we should not trust assertions un-
less the investigator was likely to have encountered possibili-
ties of disproof. That epistemological point should be applied
here, and thus we should ask of the organized crime expert,
how would he have known if his conjectures were wrong?
How would he have learned if members acted without author-
ization? How would he have perceived if someone else were
the boss? His knowledge, if it was based solely on confirma-
tory incidents, is too likely to be the product of unwitting mis-
perceptions and biases, is too likely to be a construct, to be
trusted. Without the real possibility of encountering dis-
proof, the conclusions of the nonscientific expert should be re-
jected just as a scientific expert's would be.
Scientists have the possibility of encountering disproof
by doing controlled studies seeking what is theoretically for-
bidden, but controlled experiments are not always necessary:
Experience can provide a comparable surrogate. The experi-
ence must be critically examined, however, for not all experi-
ence provides the opportunity for disproof. The experience
must be the kind that gives consistent, repeated, and unam-
biguous feedback about possible errors.
122
For example, assume a claim that logs on a truck were
incorrectly secured and thereby caused an accident. The de-
fendant introduces evidence that the logs were secured in
fashion X. A truck driver then testifies as an expert for the
defense and states that in his opinion logs secured in fashion
X are unlikely to come loose. Should that opinion be allowed?
That truck driver-witness has not done controlled studies
that support his opinion, but if his experience has included
many instances of trucks driven with logs secured as de-
scribed, he has good grounds for the opinion based upon his
experience. There is a strong likelihood that if his opinion
were based on a faulty premise he would know it. He would
circumstances, people will be motivated preconsciously to avoid the ap-
preciation of adverse information, and hence fail to adopt appropri-
ately vigilant cognitive modes. Their thinking turns wishful.
122. See id. at 99, n.99 ("[A] number of psychologists have concluded that for
feedback to work, it must by unambiguous and, unless particularly salient, re-
peated."). Cf. Newman, supra note 63, at 184 ("[Mlany clinical experts never
obtain feedback on how their prior recommendations have fared. Without feed-
back, there is no opportunity to learn one's early mistakes . .. ").
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have suffered accidents.123 Such experiences would furnish a
very practical substitute for the controlled studies of science.
All experiences, however, do not give such unambiguous
feedback about possible errors, 124 and without it, the claimed
learning should be suspect. A recent case, United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 125 about handwriting experts provides an ex-
ample of a court failing to make distinctions about the learn-
ing potential of different kinds of experiences. The court first
determined that appropriate validation research for this ex-
pertise had not been done. 126 Forensic document examina-
tion, consequently, is not scientific knowledge within the
meaning of Daubert.127 The court, however, accepting the
dual-level approach to expertise, 28 concluded that the hand-
writing expert, as a nonscientific, technical expert, could still
testify because the witness was qualified and had technical
knowledge that could assist the jury. 129
123. Cf. Hughes v. Hemingway Transp., 539 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Defendant's tractor-trailer, which skidded during icy conditions, injured the
motorcyclist-plaintiff. Id. The court held that defendant's proffered expert, who
claimed expertise on the proper techniques for controlling a skidding truck dur-
ing icy conditions acquired "exclusively through training provided by his em-
ployer United Parcel Service," was not qualified to testify. Id. at 133. "Specifi-
cally, Mr. Walsh testified that he did not have either a scientific or engineering
background; that he was unable to calculate the coefficient of friction on the
roadway at the time of accident." Id.
The true issue, however, was the proffered expert's technical education.
"One need not be an engineer ... or know how to calculate the coefficient of
friction to know how to drive a truck on ice." Murphy, supra note 6, at 641. The
issue should have been whether Walsh's experiences had given him clear and
repeated feedback on proper and improper truck-driving under icy conditions.
124. See, e.g., Faust, supra note 40, at 37 ("[11n many instances experience
can be downright misleading. The feedback provided by experience in psychia-
try is exceedingly complex and ambiguous.").
125. U.S. v. Starzecpyzl, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
126. Id. at 1037 ("[T]he Court is not aware of any substantial argument that
proper validation testing cannot be conducted.").
127. Id. at 1038 ("[Florensic document examination, despite the existence of
a certification program, professional journals and other trappings of science,
cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as 'scientific ... knowledge."').
128. Id. at 1040 ('The Court therefore finds no support for the proposition
that Daubert extends past the 'scientific' branch of Rule 702 to other forms of
expert testimony.").
129. Id. at 1043 ("[T]he witness must possess such relevant form of "[techni-
cal or other specialized] knowledge.' Second, the knowledge must 'assist the
trier of fact.' Finally, the witness must be 'qualified as an expert.'").
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The court's common sense accepted that various hand-
writings have significant similarities and differences, 13 0 and
that from these characteristics the source of the handwriting
could be determined. 13 1 Through experience, the court as-
serted, forensic document examiners can become proficient in
these determinations.
In a nutshell, over a period of years, FDE's gradually ac-
quire the skill of identifying similarities and differences
between groups of handwriting exemplars. Such exper-
tise is similar to that developed by a harbor pilot who has
repeatedly navigated a particular waterway. The Court
therefore treats forensic document expertise under the
"technical, or other specialized knowledge" branch of Rule
702, which is apparently not governed by Daubert.
132
As a result, reliable expertise, although not demon-
strated, is possible, and handwriting expertise ought to be ad-
mitted. "[E]xperienced individuals may be able to detect 'sig-
nificant' similarities and differences between sets of
handwriting exemplars .... [R]eliable determinations of gen-
uineness are possible .... The Court therefore finds sufficient
indicia of reliability to sustain the admissibility of FDE ex-
pertise as nonscientific expert testimony."
33
At first glance, this seems to make sense. Handwritings
are not all the same, and the variations in them seem a way
130. Id. at 1044 ("Although Ms. Kelly [the prosecution's witness supporting
the reliability of forensic document examination] was unable to explain to the
Court's satisfaction precisely how 'significant' similarities or differences were
identified, the Court has no doubt that such identifications can be performed, in
some case by cursory examination.").
131. U.S. v. Starzecpyzl, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Even in
as limited a class of writings as signatures, there are a large number of possible
points of comparison .... As a matter of simple logic, the greater the number of
points of comparison, the greater the certainty of the determination as to
genuineness.").
132. Id. at 1029.
133. Id. at 1046-47. The crucial question is not whether experts can identify
handwriting, but can they do it better than jurors. Id. The court's common
sense said the experts, because of motivation and experience, would perform
better than jurors. Id.
First, while jurors may have the ability to locate significant similari-
ties and differences between sets of writings, it is not clear that they
will, or should, take the time to conduct such comparisons de novo dur-
ing a trial .... Second the Court does not doubt that, as with most
tasks, skill increases with experience, so FDE's are likely to do a better
job than even highly motivated jurors.
Id. at 1045.
3411997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
to distinguish a cursive's source. Someone who regularly ex-
amines writings ought to be better than the rest of us at mak-
ing such distinctions even though scientific studies have not
been done. Surely we do not doubt that the harbor pilot has
specialized knowledge that we lack, and the forensic docu-
ment examiner seems similar.
That similarity, however, may only be superficial. Both
the harbor pilot and the FDE may have extensive experience,
but their experiences may not be equal teachers. The court
should analyze how likely it was that the experiences would
have revealed any mistakes or errors in the expert's methods.
The harbor pilot's experiences have given him expertise.
At least as indicated about river boat pilots in Twain's A Life
on the Mississippi, 134 every time the pilot ventures through
the harbor he gets instantaneous feedback about his deci-
sions. He navigates successfully or he runs aground. We can
have high confidence that he would have learned about mis-
takes if he committed them. As a result, when he tells us this
is a safe way to traverse this waterway, we can have confi-
dence in the assertion.135
The handwriting expert's experiences do not seem to
have this same crucial component. When the handwriting
analyst determines that Jones did or did not pen the letter,
she does not get unambiguous feedback about her decisions.
Handwriting determination is not "an area, like practical
plumbing, in which the results of correct or incorrect practice
would be obvious to bystander and practitioner alike. Rather,
it is exactly the kind of situation in which it is easiest to fool
oneself and others. 1 3 6 In the normal course of her business,
at best she might confront another "expert" that reached an-
other conclusion,13 7 but she, quite naturally, could still main-
tain faith in her abilities and dismiss the other opinion. She
134. See MARK TWAIN, A LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI Ch. 6-12 (1899).
135. Cf. Weinberg, supra note 49, at 12:
[If] a party of mountain climbers ... argue about the path to some peak
[, t]heir arguments are conditioned by the social structure of the expe-
dition, but when they find the right path they know it because then
they get to the peak. No one would write a book about mountaineering
with the title Constructing Everest.
136. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Ra-
tional Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137
U. PA. L. REV. 731, 739-40 (1989).
137. See Irby Todd, Do Experts Frequently Disagree?, 18 J. FORENSIC Sci. 455
(1973) (explaining that such experts, however, have been rarely opposed).
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would ordinarily never seem to confront the empirical world
in a way that unambiguously could prove her wrong.
138 If
that is so, there are not good grounds for believing her knowl-
edge is more than a construct.
If courts are truly to admit only expert knowledge based
on good grounds, courts must carefully analyze claims of ex-
periential learning. Since humans are so easily prey to self-
deception, even plausible explanations of how experience
would have demonstrated the witness's premises wrong, if
they were, should be skeptically probed. Science has learned
that a common defect of human reasoning is to too readily
assume a causal relationship from a temporal sequence.1
39 If
A occurs, and then B happens, we too easily conclude A
causes B. The dangers are especially acute when we perform
A and we want B to occur. If we believe that we can cause B,
we naturally attend to the confirming proof of the temporal
sequence and become convinced of our conjecture. 140 That,
however, is not sufficient for giving good grounds for the
claimed knowledge. The crucial question needs asking: How
would the experience have shown the premise wrong if it
were? Without a satisfactory answer, the claim should not be
accepted as "knowledge."
Many areas might illustrate such possible flawed knowl-
edge. 4 ' Medicine is one of them. The doctor believes that a
138. J. Harris, How Much do People Write Alike?: A Study of Signatures, 48
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 647 (1958) (stating that a handwriting expert who
actually looked for signatures from different people that were indistinguishably
similar found many examples).
139. See BEVERIDGE, supra note 41, at 154:
The most notorious source of fallacy is probably post hoc, ergo propter
hoc, that is, to attribute a causal relationship between what has been
done and what follows .... All our actions and reason are based on the
legitimate assumption that all events have their cause in what has
gone before, but error often arises when we attribute a causal role to a
particular preceding event or interference on our part which in reality
had no influence on the outcome observed.
140. See Faigman, supra note 7, at 1055 ("A researcher's bias, although per-
haps benign, may manifest itself through selective attention to the expected
behavior, thus operating as a self-fulfilling confirmation of the hypothesis.").
141. See, e.g., Ambrose Bierce, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY, in THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF AMBROSE BIERCE 229 (1970):
EFFECT, n. The second of two phenomena which always occur to-
gether in the same order. The first, called a Cause, is said to generate
the other-which is no more sensible than it would be for one who had
never seen a dog except in pursuit of a rabbit to declare the rabbit the
cause of the dog.
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certain treatment works on a certain condition. He gives it,
and the patient gets better. He concludes that his treatments
effects the cure. If we are to have good grounds, however, for
this claim, we need to know how this experience would reveal
that the assertion was wrong if it were. The answer seems
obvious: If the treatment did not work, the patient would not
get better. Certainly, if the patient did not improve after the
treatment, we would have good grounds for believing that the
treatment was inefficacious. 142 The converse, however, is not
true. If the patient gets better, how does the doctor know
that something other than the treatment did not effect the
improvement? Indeed, as the do-no-harm principle indicates,
patients often improve without treatment. As long as the
doctor's experience consists only of the confirmatory proof of
treatment followed by cure, we can have little confidence that
the assertion that "treatment causes cure" is anything more
than a construct.14 3
D. Nonscientific Community Action
Science teaches that we can be most confident that sci-
ence has advanced knowledge when a community has tested
or incorporated a claim in ways to show potential flaws. This
is most likely to happen when there is a group with diverse
biases who can be threatened by the work of others or seek to
build upon it. The isolated scientist should be regarded skep-
tically, and we should have just as much doubt about the iso-
lated expert.14 1 Just because a group of people claim the
142. Cf. SAMs & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 30, at 74 ("A scientific or profes-
sional field has a powerful defense against unsubstantiated or exaggerated con-
clusions: replication. Professional/technical field that apply such knowledge
have a 'defense'; erroneous principles will be found out because patients will not
get well, planes will not fly, or chemicals will not synthesized.").
143. Cf. Brehmer, supra note 103, at 236:
If a psychologist invents a new therapy, he generally gives it to those
who need it the most. Almost inevitably, he will now find they have
improved and he will be led to conclude that his treatment was useful
.... The problem is that there is a very likely alternative explanation:
that the improvement he observed is simply a regression effect.
See also August Piper, Jr., Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Respon-
sibility: Critique of a Paper by Elyn Saks, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 35 (1994)
("ITihat a patient improves under a physician's treatment says nothing about
the accuracy of the diagnosis.").
144. See LATOUR, supra note 28, at 152-53:
[A]n isolated specialist is a contradiction in terms. Either you are iso-
lated and very quickly stop being a specialist, or you remain a special-
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same expertise, however, it does not mean that an expert is
part of a community that can help assure that claims of
knowledge transcend construction. The community's actions
need to be analyzed to see if that community truly tests or
meaningfully incorporates the work.
Harbor pilots, for example, might be part of a community
whose actions can help lift learning above construction. At
least Mr. Bixby, Twain's Mississippi mentor, was part of a
community of river boat pilots who shared their knowledge
with each other.145 If one stated that a particular point was a
safe place to cross a channel, others could be expected to fol-
low. Pilots, concerned about their standing in this commu-
nity and planning to build on the knowledge of others, had
reasons to be circumspect in claims. More important, the
community incorporated the knowledge and thereby tested it
in a practical way by finding out if passage could be safely
made as claimed.
146
Handwriting expertise again seems different.
Starzecpyzel concluded that handwriting identifications are
based not on publicly articulable standards, but apparently
individualized criteria. 147 Even if such identifications did
lead to feedback about possible errors, a community would
not be able to test or incorporate the methods of others be-
cause that method could not be meaningfully communicated
to it. 1 48 The kind of community action that can help tran-
ist but this means you are not isolated. Others who are as specialised
as you, are trying out your material so fiercely that they may push the
proof race to point where all your resources are barely enough to win
the encounter. . . . But as long a research in internal combustion,
neuroendriconolgy, geology or chip design does not yet exist as a job,
there is no specialist inside and no interested groups outside.
Cf. Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23
FAM. L.Q. 383, 395-96 (1989) ("The child sexual abuse expert group tends to be
socially and professionally isolated, unlikely to learn from professional col-
leagues in other fields.").
145. See TWAIN, supra note 134, at Ch. 15.
146. Similarly, the hypothetical truck driver's expertise is more reliable if
not only he, but a community of truck drivers, secured their loads in the de-
scribed fashion with reports circulating among them about problems caused by
the loads.
147. U.S. v. Starzecpyzl, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
148. Cf. Nijboer, supra note 49, at 178 ("(It is possible to speak of expertise
only if there is a degree of consensus about the contents of the specialty and its
methods. Ideally, the professionalism of the expert is institutionalized, with
the result that the object and methods of the science in question are clearly
specified.").
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scend construction does not seem possible in such a field.149
Furthermore, in a field like this, we can expect that individ-
ual's conclusion to be derived in a less rigorous manner than
in a field where there is meaningful community action.
Where others cannot test or incorporate the work, a prime
motivation for careful observation and inference has been re-
moved from the individual expert.
Just as we can learn from experience, but not all exper-
iences are good teachers, communities can help assure that
knowledge has good grounds, but not all community action
produces that assurance.
E. The Effects of Assessing Expertise
We can only speculate about the effects of truly assessing
nonscientific expertise for confidence that it is based on good
grounds. Courts have not routinely been making such assess-
ments. While courts may usually be considering whether an
expert has encountered the world he testifies about, courts
less often seem to have been examining the expert's experi-
ence to see if it furnishes an acceptable surrogate for scien-
tific proof by disproof. And, I believe, even more infrequently,
if at all, have courts examined whether there has been com-
munity action that effectively tests or incorporates a non-
scientific expert's claims in ways that would show flaws.
Until these analyses are regularly made, we cannot know
the possible range of experiences and communities of exper-
tise that should lead to confidence that the claimed knowl-
edge is truly based on good grounds. Such assessments, how-
ever, will probably result in the exclusion of some expertise
now admitted. This can be beneficial. Without some experts,
trials might be less expensive and more efficient. And per-
haps when suspect experiential learning is excluded, there
will be incentives not now existing to do the rigorous studies
that could give good grounds for the claimed knowledge. The
result then would be better information to determine the
facts upon which we base our justice.
149. Cf. Levine, supra note 29, at 64 ("The canons of method require that we
admit as scientific only that which is public and communicable ....
[E]xperiments in psychology are not entirely communicable and ... the findings
are therefore not truly public and may not be admissible as science.").
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CONCLUSION
Since scientific evidence must be assessed to see if it is
based on good grounds, all expertise ought to be similarly as-
sessed. Scientific claims can transcend construction when
they come from encounters with nature; when confirmatory
proof is not relied upon, but rigorous proof by disproof is
sought; and when a community has tested or incorporated the
claim in ways to show possible shortcomings. All expertise
should be subjected to a similar analysis.

